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This paper bolsters Prescott’s (2004) claim that high taxes are responsible for lacklustre labor 
market performance in continental European countries. We develop a lifecycle model with 
endogenous skill formation, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous retirement. Labor 
taxation distorts not only labor supply, but also education and retirement decisions. 
Actuarially unfair pensions further exacerbate labor tax distortions on retirement. Education 
subsidies can nevertheless cushion the adverse impact of taxation on skill formation. 
Feedbacks between education, labor supply, and retirement are important. The model is 
simulated with realistic behavioral elasticities that are consistent with microeconometric 
evidence. If, besides labor supply, also learning and retirement are endogenous, the 
uncompensated (compensated) elasticity of the tax base equals 0.46 (0.85), which is more 
than twice as large as the standard uncompensated (compensated) labor supply elasticity of 
0.18 (0.40). Furthermore, life-cycle interactions between education, working and retirement 
are quantitatively important and the interactions raise all behavioral elasticities substantially. 
For example, the uncompensated labor supply elasticity increases with one-half due to life-
cycle interactions (to 0.26). We demonstrate that low European labor supply can be fully 
explained by taxation without relying on unrealistically high labor supply elasticities. 
Reducing labor market distortions, cutting benefit levels, lowering tax rates, and making 
(early) retirement actuarially fairer, therefore boosts labor supply, delays retirement, and 
stimulates skill formation. In addition, high education subsidies are needed in large welfare 
states to off-set explicit and implicit tax burdens on human capital investment. 
JEL Code: E2, E6, H2, H5, I2, I3, J2. 
Keywords: skill formation, human capital, labor supply, retirement, tax policy, benefit 
systems, pension policy, welfare state. 
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In his inﬂuential article Prescott (2004) provoked a heated debate on whether the high levels
of taxation, which are associated with large welfare states, are responsible for the poor
European labor market performance. Alesina et al. (2005) responded, and demonstrated
that taxation can only explain the European experience with empirically implausibly large
elasticities of labor supply. As an alternative explanation, they propose a ‘social multiplier’
in leisure demand, which creates a culture of leisure in which Europeans do not wish to work
so hard as Americans do.1 Until now, the debate is far from settled, and this paper sheds
new light on the issue.
We argue that labor supply is not the only relevant choice margin. Indeed, education and
retirement are crucial determinants of labor market entry and exit, and, therefore, of the
size of the tax base. Education and retirement are both aﬀected by taxation. According to
the Le Chˆ atelier Principle, the elasticity of the tax base is expected to increase substantially
when more than one margin is aﬀected by income taxation (Diamond and Mirrlees, 2002).
Income taxation reduces investments in human capital if not all education expenditures are
tax-deductible forgone labor earnings. Indeed, direct costs are around one quarter of total
monetary costs (Trostel, 1993).2 The labor tax directly distorts retirement decisions, because
utility from retirement is not taxed, whereas continued work is. This direct impact of labor
taxation on retirement is often neglected. Indeed, the retirement literature mainly focuses on
the implicit marginal tax rate on additional years of work due to the presence of actuarially
unfair (early) retirement incomes, see for example Gruber and Wise (1999). An exception is
Duval (2004), who also studies the eﬀects of the direct marginal tax on retirement.
Furthermore, education, labor supply, and retirement interact over the life cycle. Invest-
ments in human capital only pay oﬀ if human capital is utilized in the labor market. The
utilization rate of human capital increases with labor force participation and hours worked
and human capital is written oﬀ at (early) retirement.3 Low labor force participation rates
of older workers imply that the time-horizons over which investments in human capital are
harvested are short, and the incentives to invest in human capital are weakened accordingly.
Similarly, incentives to participate in the labor market, to supply labor, and to retire later
improve with higher levels of education, because better-educated workers forgo higher labor
earnings.
1Alesina et al. (2005) present anecdotal evidence in favor of their ‘social multiplier’, but solid empirical
evidence is lacking. This explanation is the polar opposite of theories that emphasize rivalry in consumption,
which results in rat-races and status seeking, see for example Layard (2005) If true, Americans would work
excessively hard, in comparison with Europeans. In any case, both approaches share a short distance between
assumption and conclusion; the explanation for observed behavior (too much or too little leisure) is essentially
assumed.
2Non-monetary costs, such as eﬀort, are probably important as well in view of the observed high ﬁnancial
returns to education, which are considerably larger than the risk-free rate (Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005).
In theory, non-insurable risks and capital market failures can also explain these high returns. However,
empirically neither capital market imperfections nor risk have suﬃcient explanatory power to justify the
observed high returns we see in the data. See the discussion in Jacobs (2007).
3High levels of taxation, generous social beneﬁts, and strong labor market regulations reduce labor force
participation rates, hours worked, and employment (see e.g. Nickell, 1997; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999;
Saez, 2002; Lalive et al., 2006). Generous early retirement and pension schemes give strong incentives to
older workers to retire many years before statutory retirement ages (Gruber and Wise, 1999).
1The data also suggest that complementarities between investment in human capital (skill
creation), labor force participation (skill utilization), and retirement (skill depreciation) are
important. The diﬀerences in labor force participation rates between workers with lower
secondary education and workers with a tertiary education are double digit numbers (15–
30%-points). The mirror image is that unemployment rates fall by 2–6%-points when skill
levels increase from lower secondary to tertiary education (OECD, 2005a). Labor force
participation rates of older cohorts are also much higher when individuals have more initial
education. The diﬀerence in labor force participation rates between older workers with less
than upper-secondary and those with tertiary education is roughly 20–30%-points (OECD,
2006). Skilled workers retire much later than unskilled workers.
The main questions of this paper are therefore the following. How do taxes aﬀect skill
formation (education), labor supply and retirement over the life cycle? And what is the
impact of education subsidies and actuarially unfair pensions? How important are the com-
plementarities between skill formation, labor eﬀort, and retirement for the overall impact of
welfare state policies on economic incentives and overall welfare?
To answer these questions, this paper develops and simulates a stylized life-cycle model
of education (skill formation), labor supply (skill utilization), and retirement (skill depreci-
ation). Following the human capital approach, individuals invest in human capital during
initial periods of their life cycle, until the marginal costs of investing more time and resources
are equal to the marginal beneﬁts in the form of higher future wages, see for example Becker
(1964), and Mincer (1974). After ﬁnishing initial education, individuals enter the labor
market and utilize their human capital by endogenously supplying labor. The labor supply
decision is modeled in a standard, neoclassical fashion. Human capital fully depreciates as
individuals retire. The novelty of our model is that the retirement decision is modeled in a
parsimonious way as the discrete decision to exit the labor market completely. Individuals
retire when the marginal utility beneﬁts of retirement are equal to the marginal costs of
retirement: forgone labor earnings during the last year working.
Our theoretical model thereby contributes to the existing retirement literature. Often,
researchers model retirement as a corner solution of zero labor supply by forcing wage rates
to decline after some speciﬁed age (e.g., due to health shocks), by introducing work-related
costs that increase with age, or by employing taste shifters in the utility function, which
raise the marginal utility from leisure over time, see for example Gustman and Steinmeier
(2005), and the references in De Hek and Van Erp (2007). These modeling strategies have
the disadvantage that the optimal retirement age is to an important extent imposed by
the modeling choices of the analyst, rather than being derived from optimizing behavior.
Similarly, we do not need discrete choices in the labor supply decision, where labor supply
takes discrete positive values before retirement, and is zero at retirement (for example Rust,
1989; Van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2005; Blau, 2007). A discrete labor supply choice has the
unattractive property of being exogenous over wide intervals before retirement. Furthermore,
the life-cycle model developed in this paper avoids the analytical non-tractability of a Stock
and Wise (1990) retirement option model, which is extended with endogenous labor supply
in, for example, French (2005).
We show theoretically that taxation distorts labor supply, educational investment, and
retirement. Actuarially unfair pensions further exacerbate tax distortions on retirement.
Hours worked and later retirement are complementary to initial education. Skill formation is
2therefore impaired when the returns to skill formation are low if not much labor is supplied
and skill utilization rates are low, and if skill depreciation is quick as a result of (early)
retirement. More skill creation also boosts skill utilization, and slows down skill depreciation,
because higher levels of human capital raise the opportunity costs of leisure and retirement.
Consequently, education policy can be important to cushion the distortionary impact of
taxes and actuarially unfair pensions.
The theoretical model is simulated to quantify the impact of labor market distortions,
(early) retirement schemes, and education policies on incentives to learn, to work, and to
retire. We demonstrate that taxation is much more distortionary if, besides labor supply,
education and retirement decisions are taken into consideration. In particular, the uncom-
pensated elasticity of the tax base (0.46) is more than twice as large as the conventional
uncompensated elasticity of labor supply (0.18). Further, the conventional uncompensated
labor supply elasticity increases with almost 50% (from 0.18 to 0.26) due to interactions
of labor supply with education and retirement. Elasticities of retirement and education
also substantially increase due to interactions. Hence, feedbacks between skill formation,
skill creation and skill depreciation are quantitatively important. To properly measure the
welfare costs of welfare states, we also computed the compensated elasticities. Again, the
compensated elasticity of the tax base (0.85) is more than twice as high as the conven-
tional compensated labor supply elasticity (0.40). Welfare state policies therefore create
much larger distortions than commonly believed. Our simulations show that low European
labor supply can be fully explained by high levels of taxation, without relying on unrealisti-
cally high labor supply elasticities as in Prescott (2004), and without resorting to a ‘social
multiplier’ in leisure as in Alesina et al. (2005).4
Education policy can mitigate the adverse consequences of taxes on skill formation. In
particular, policies to foster human capital cannot be seen in isolation from labor market
policies, tax and beneﬁt systems, and pension schemes. Education subsidies do not only
reduce the explicit tax burden on skill formation, but also the implicit tax burden caused by
low skill utilization (also resulting from high taxes) and quick skill depreciation (resulting
from actuarially unfair pensions). Furthermore, actuarially unfair pensions severely exac-
erbate the pre-existing labor tax distortions on retirement choices. Hence, from a policy
perspective it is not suﬃcient to restrict attention to reducing the implicit tax on retirement
alone, as the explicit tax rate stimulates early retirement as well. Reforms in labor markets,
pension systems and tax-beneﬁt systems may not only have direct beneﬁcial eﬀects on labor
supply and retirement, but may also have important dynamic eﬃciency gains by indirectly
lowering implicit tax wedges on skill formation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a theory
of skill formation, skill utilization and skill depreciation. Section 3 quantitatively illustrates
the importance of interactions between skill formation, labor markets, and pension schemes.
Section 4 provides the policy conclusions.
4Indeed, it is perhaps more appropriate to think of the labor supply decision in macroeconomic models as
a measure for labor supply, which encompasses more dimensions than solely hours worked, but, for example,
also education, retirement and labor force participation.
32 A theory of skill formation, skill utilization and skill
depreciation
We develop a standard life-cycle model, which is augmented with human capital investment,
endogenous labor supply, and endogenous retirement. Labor markets are perfectly competi-
tive and frictionless.5 By simultaneously analyzing human capital investment, labor supply,
and retirement decisions, the model allows us to spell out various complementarities over
the life cycle.
We assume that a representative individual is born at time t = 0 and has a life-span T,
which is exogenously given. During the ﬁrst stages of the life cycle, the individual invests
S years acquiring human capital while not working at all. The decision to enter the labor
market after initial education is therefore made on the extensive margin. If the individual
is in the labor force, the individual endogenously supplies labor. Thus, labor is supplied on
the intensive (hours) margin. Retirement is modeled on the extensive margin as the decision
to exit the labor market completely at age R. The life-time time constraint states that total
years in school S, in the labor market R − S, and in retirement T − R should equal the life
span T of the individual:
T = S + (R − S) + (T − R). (1)
At each date, the individual derives instantaneous utility from consumption Ct. Only
when the individual is in the labor market (S < t ≤ R), he may also derive utility from
leisure Lt. The time constraint while working states that the fraction of time working Lt
plus the fraction of time consumed as leisure Lt should be equal to the total time endowment
– which is normalized at unity –
1 = Lt + Lt, S < t ≤ R. (2)
In this representative agent setting, one can, alternatively, interpret Lt as the employment
rate, and Lt as the non-employment rate. Individuals also derive utility from the years they
are retired T − R, where R denotes the retirement age.
Life-time utility of the individual is given by a time-separable function of instantaneous






V (Lt)exp(−ρt)dt + X(T − R), (3)
with U0(Ct) > 0,U00(Ct) < 0, V 0(Lt) > 0, V 00(Lt) < 0, X0(T − R) > 0, and X00(T − R) < 0.
ρ is the subjective rate of time preference.
This preference structure requires careful treatment of all relevant time constraints. Dou-
ble counting should be avoided by setting leisure time Lt at zero when individuals are enrolled
in education, or when individuals are retired, i.e., Lt ≡ 0 for t ≤ S and R < t ≤ T. The value
of retirement leisure is governed by X(T − R). Adding leisure utility of retirement through
5This is probably not the best description of the labor markets in Europe, but economic theory is still in
its infancy when it comes to studying the joint determination of labor supply, human capital formation and
wages in non-competitive labor markets. See Charlot and Decreuze (2007), and the references therein, for
an example.
4V (Lt) would count leisure beneﬁts of retirement twice. The costs of forgone labor time are
measured by forgone labor earnings, as individuals spend their complete time endowment
on education at the beginning of the life-cycle. Adding disutility from education eﬀort via
V (Lt) would count the time costs of education twice.6
By assuming that time devoted to retirement or education is a diﬀerent commodity than
time enjoyed as leisure during working life, we can completely separate the labor supply
decision on the intensive margin from the education and retirement decisions on the extensive
margin. The major advantage of doing so is that we obtain a parsimonious description of
the education and retirement decisions, and a smooth path for labor supply over the working
career. However, the utility function is also partially endogenous, since the domain of the
utility integral for leisure is determined by endogenous education and retirement decisions.
Hence, if more time is invested in education or spent in retirement, time available in the
labor market and time enjoyed as leisure diminish.7
The individual optimally decides the number of years S in education. W(S) is the
production function of human capital. W(S) features positive but diminishing marginal
returns to additional initial schooling: W 0(S) > 0, W 00(S) < 0. W(S) is assumed to be
constant over time. The costs of education are earnings W(S) forgone while not working,
and the constant direct costs P per year of education. All costs and beneﬁts of education
are monetary; we ignore non-monetary costs or beneﬁts.
The individual starts his life with A0 in ﬁnancial assets, which are normalized to zero
for convenience (A0 = 0). Borrowing on a perfect capital market at constant real interest
rate r is possible to ﬁnance the costs of living and the costs of education in the periods
during which the individual is enrolled in initial education. The ﬂow budget constraint of
the individual who is still in school (t ≤ S) is therefore given by
˙ At = rAt − Ct − (1 − σ)P, 0 ≤ t ≤ S, (4)
where a dot denotes a time-derivative. Since A0 = 0, and Ct and P are both positive, the
individual accumulates debt in the ﬁrst periods of his life. σ is the subsidy rate on direct
educational costs.
After graduation, the individual starts earning gross labor income W(S)Lt. The ﬂow
budget constraints after graduation until retirement (S < t ≤ R) state that the increase in
ﬁnancial assets should equal total interest income (which is negative while individuals repay
debts) plus net labor income (1 − τ)W(S)Lt, minus consumption
˙ At = rAt + (1 − τ)W(S)Lt − Ct, S < t ≤ R, (5)
where τ is the labor income tax rate. We assume for simplicity’s sake that interest income
is untaxed.
6The separability between consumption and leisure in the utility function is needed to avoid discontinuities
in the marginal utility of consumption, since the individual only consumes hours of leisure while being in
active in the labor market, and Lt = 0 for t ≤ S and R < t ≤ T.
7The partial endogeneity of the utility function could be regarded as a drawback on theoretical grounds.
Nevertheless, other approaches to capture the retirement decision and labor supply jointly are subject to
more severe theoretical problems, see the introduction for a discussion.
5During retirement (R < t ≤ T) the individual runs down his accumulated assets for
consumption purposes:
˙ At = rAt + (1 − τB)B − Ct, R < t ≤ T, (6)
where B is the constant retirement beneﬁt, and τB denotes the rate at which retirement
beneﬁts are taxed. One should interpret the pension beneﬁt B as that part of pension
beneﬁts that is actuarially completely non-neutral, since individuals only receive retirement
beneﬁts conditional upon full retirement. Any actuarially fair pension savings are covered
by the voluntary saving decision. The individual has no bequest motive and ends his life
with zero wealth: AT = 0.
Integration of the asset accumulation constrains, and imposing the initial and terminal










(1 − τ)W(S)Lt exp(−rt)dt +
Z T
R
(1 − τB)B exp(−rt)dt.
The individual maximizes life-time utility by choosing consumption, labor supply, educa-
tion, and retirement subject to the household budget constraint and the time constraints.8
Using standard routines we obtain the Euler equation for consumption:
˙ Ct
Ct







is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption.
Similarly, we ﬁnd a Euler equation for leisure:
˙ Lt
Lt







> 0 is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in leisure
demand. Leisure time increases over time as long as the interest rate is larger than the pure
rate of time preference (r > ρ).
The static labor supply equation is also standard, and given by
V 0(Lt)
U0(Ct)
= (1 − τ)W(S), S < t ≤ R. (10)
The marginal willingness to demand leisure time decreases with the net wage rate and
increases with the level of taxation. The gross wage rate increases with skill level S. Hence,
8We assume that ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient. The latter condition is not necessarily
fulﬁlled due to the feedbacks between labor supply, retirement, and human capital accumulation. Only
suﬃciently strong decreasing returns in schooling, and suﬃciently concave leisure and retirement sub-utility
functions ensure an interior solution. We assume that these conditions are met.
6this equation gives the ﬁrst complementarity. Better-skilled workers supply more labor if
the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect in labor supply (which is the empirically
plausible case, see also Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; and Evers et al., 2007). Indeed, if
labor supply is interpreted as the labor force participation rate, higher wages can explain
why higher-educated workers also have higher participation rates.
The optimal number of years in initial education follows from the ﬁrst-order conditions










+ (1 − σ)P, (11)
where S ≡
V 0(LS)LS
V (LS) > 0 is the elasticity of the leisure sub-utility function at time S.
This is the modiﬁed Mincer equation stating that the net present value of marginal returns
to initial education (evaluated at the time S) should be equal to net marginal costs of
an additional year of schooling. The latter comprise net forgone labor earnings and direct,
subsidized expenditures. Years spent in initial education increase when the returns to human
capital investments are larger. We again encounter the ﬁrst complementarity that returns to
education increase when individuals supply more labor during working-life (Lt larger). The
second complementarity is that investments in human capital increase when the working life
is longer, and individuals retire later (R larger). We have to note here that the returns at
the end of the life cycle are heavily discounted, so that expanding the retirement age only
has small eﬀects when discount rates are substantial.
The term LS +
1−LS
S originates from the fact that more time spent on initial education
lowers the time-span over which labor can be supplied or leisure can be consumed, see the
utility function (3). LS is associated with the marginal loss of forgone labor earnings, and
1−LS
S is associated with marginal forgone leisure time when individuals invest more time in
initial education. In the absence of endogenous labor supply during working-life, LS = 1,
and this term cancels out. The same is true if the sub-utility function over leisure V (LS)
is linear, i.e., when S = 1. In that case, more time spent in initial education reduces the
marginal value of working and leisure time during working life equally.
Labor taxation reduces investments in initial education as long as direct costs are positive
(P > 0), and the subsidy rate is not equal to the tax rate (τ 6= σ). If the subsidy rate σ
equals the tax rate on labor τ, taxation is neutral with respect to human capital investments,
because all costs and beneﬁts of human capital formation are symmetrically aﬀected by tax
and subsidy rates. Labor taxation nevertheless reduces labor supply (if the substitution eﬀect
dominates), and also reduces the retirement age (again assuming dominant substitution
eﬀects). Hence, labor taxation indirectly discourages investments in initial education by
lowering the utilization rate of human capital while working and shortening the payback
period of investments in education.
Optimal retirement is given by
X0(T − R)
U0(C0)exp(−rR)
= (1 − τ)W(S)








V (LR) > 0, and % ≡
(1−τB)B
(1−τ)W(S)LR denotes the net replacement rate of retirement
income in terms of ﬁnal earnings. % is the implicit tax rate on continued work due to non-
actuarially fair pensions. The marginal willingness to pay for an additional year in retirement
7should be equal to the marginal costs of an extra year in retirement. The marginal beneﬁt
is the marginal rate of substitution between retirement utility and consumption at the date
of retirement. The marginal costs are given by the value of the net forgone labor earnings in
the last year on the labor market. U0(C0) captures wealth eﬀects in the retirement decision.
Richer individuals have a lower marginal utility of income and retire earlier – ceteris paribus.
The individual has stronger incentives to retire later if he has more initial education S, since
more education raises labor earnings forgone during retirement. Note also that incentives to
retire are weaker when individuals utilize their skills better by supplying more labor during
working life (higher LR). The second complementarity is, again, that better-skilled workers
retire later when the income eﬀect of higher skills are outweighed by the substitution eﬀects
of higher skills.
Again, there is a term (1 − %)LR +
1−LR
R representing the impact of retirement on the
time-span over which individuals enjoy labor earnings and ordinary leisure, see the utility
function (3). (1 − %)LR corresponds with the marginal loss of forgone labor earnings, which
are reduced one-for-one with the implicit tax on retirement due to actuarially unfair pensions.
1−LR
S measures the marginal value of forgone leisure time when individuals retire earlier. In
the absence of an endogenous leisure demand decision and actuarially fair pensions (LR = 1
and % = 0) this term would vanish. Similarly, the last term cancels out if the leisure sub-
utility function V (LR) is linear (R = 1), and pensions are actuarially fair (% = 0). Later
retirement then augments the marginal value of working and leisure time equally.
The labor tax directly distorts retirement decisions, because retirement utility is not
taxed, whereas continued work is. This direct impact of labor taxation on retirement is not
often discussed in the literature on retirement (e.g. Gruber and Wise, 1999). Indeed, this
literature mainly focuses on the implicit marginal tax rate on additional years of work, %,
due to the presence of actuarially unfair (early) retirement incomes. Note that, as long as
net retirement beneﬁts are taxed at lower rates than labor earnings are (τB < τ), the tax
system also distorts the retirement decision, as the actuarial fairness of retirement beneﬁts
diminishes due to this asymmetric tax treatment. The implicit tax % on continued work
exacerbates the impact of the labor tax τ on the decision to exit the labor market.
3 Simulations
How important is the impact of endogenous skill formation and retirement on the overall
elasticity of the tax base? How important are the life-cycle interactions between skill forma-
tion and labor market choices quantitatively? Furthermore, how do welfare state policies,
such as education subsidies and actuarially non-neutral pensions, aﬀect skill formation, skill
utilization, and skill depreciation? This section presents simulations of the model with some
stylized policy settings. The baseline version of the model is calibrated on empirically ob-
served values of the endogenous variables and policies, while using empirically grounded
estimates for the main elasticities.
For simulation purposes we translate the previous continuous time model to a discrete
8Table 1: Parameterization simulation model
Preferences and technologies Source
Inter-temporal elasticity consumption θ = 2 Calibrated: labor supply elasticity 0.2
Pure rate of time preference ρ = 0.02 Standard value
Inter-temporal elasticity labor ε = 0.5 Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)
Leisure preference γ = 13 Calibrated: labor supply 85%
Elasticity of retirement β = 0.99 Duval (2004), Gruber and Wise (1999)
Retirement preference η = 7 Calibrated: retirement at age 60
Elasticity human capital α = 0.55 Trostel (1993)
Productivity human capital A = 10 Calibrated: 12 years education
Time horizon T = 75 Life span 81 years, education at age 6
Prices
Real interest rate r = 0.04 Standard value
Price per year of education P = 10 1/4 of earnings (Trostel, 1993)
Policy variables
Labor tax τ = 0.5 OECD average
Education subsidy σ = 0.75 OECD average higher education
Implicit tax retirement % = 0.30 OECD average workers aged 55-64

















θ, δ, β, ε, and η are all positive parameters. θ is the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
in consumption. ε governs the inter-temporal wage elasticity of labor supply. γ is a parameter
for the preference for leisure. β is related to the elasticity of retirement with respect to net
ﬁnal earnings. η is a parameter denoting the preference for retirement.
The production function for human capital is
W(S) ≡ AS
α, 0 < α < 1, A > 0. (14)
A denotes the productivity of time invested in human capital. A may be interpreted as a
measure for ability. We solve the model numerically, see the appendix for more details on
the simulation procedure.
Table 1 summarizes the main parameters of the model. The time-span is set at 75 years,
hence T = 75. We assume that individuals start their education at age 6. Hence, individuals
die at age 81. A pure rate of time preference of ρ = 0.02 is chosen, which is fairly standard.
The same is true for the real interest rate, which is set at r = 0.04. After an extensive
review of the scarce empirical literature, Trostel (1993) sets the elasticity of the human
capital production function at α = 0.6. We use a slightly lower value of α = 0.55. The price
of education P is 10 (thousand euro) per year, such that direct costs of education are one
9quarter of total costs (see also Trostel, 1993). At baseline values, the individual’s gross labor
earnings per year are 29 (thousand euro) on average during working-life.
Based on dozens of empirical studies, the meta-analysis by Evers et al. (2007) suggests
values for the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply of 0.1 for men and 0.5 for women.
We assume that it is equal to 0.2 in the base-line simulation. If labor supply is interpreted as
labor force participation, rather than hours worked, the value for the elasticity is probably too
low, because the extensive margin is typically more elastic than the intensive margin (Saez,
2002). The appendix shows that the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply (at zero
non-labor income) equals (1−1/θ)(1/θ + 1/ε)
−1. The inter-temporal substitution elasticity
of consumption θ and the inter-temporal substitution elasticity of leisure ε thus jointly pin
down the uncompensated labor supply elasticity. Blundell and MaCurdy’s (1999) review
suggests values of the intertemporal elasticity of leisure between 0.5 and 1. Auerbach and
Kotlikoﬀ (1987) use a value of 0.8. We have set the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution
at the lower bound of ε = 0.5. Thus, in order to ensure that the uncompensated labor
supply elasticity roughly equals 0.2, we set the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption at θ = 2, which is relatively high. Indeed, a value of θ = 1 is often used in real
business-cycle models, see e.g. Lucas (1990). θ = 0.5 is suggested by most empirical micro-
economic research, see for example Attanasio and Weber (1995). However, a too low value
of θ gives implausibly low labor supply elasticities. Indeed, a value of θ below unity even
results in backward bending labor supply curves (see appendix). By setting θ = 2 we obtain
realistic labor supply behavior and, as a side-eﬀect, avoid excesssively large wealth eﬀects in
retirement. Since our analysis does not focus on inter-temporal distortions in consumption
due to, for example, capital income taxes, missing capital markets or liquidity constraints, we
do not expect to bias the simulation results by assuming θ = 2. With this parameterization
the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply is equal to (1/θ + 1/ε)
−1 = 0.4 at zero
non-labor income (see appendix).
The retirement elasticity is set at β = 0.99. The Frisch elasticity of retirement with
respect to the implicit tax on retirement (i.e., while holding wealth constant) equals −β(T −
R)/R. At a calibrated retirement age of R = 54 (age 60) the Frisch elasticity of retirement
with respect to the implicit tax is around –0.28. The estimates in Gruber and Wise (1999),
OECD (2004) and Duval (2004) imply that the uncompensated elasticity of labor force
participation of older workers with respect to the implicit tax on retirement (including wealth
and income eﬀects) is approximately one third. The appendix contains extensive sensitivity
analyses by simulating the model with a wide array of behavioral elasticities.
The baseline set of policy variables is τ = 0.5, σ = 0.75, and % = 0.3. These values match
unweighed averages for a sample of 16 continental European and Anglo-Saxon countries (see
appendix). Total marginal tax wedges on labor income (including employer contributions
and local taxes) are 51% for a single household without dependents which earns the average
production wage (OECD, 2007a). 79% is the average of subsidies on higher education, which
probably corresponds better to a marginal subsidy than the average subsidy on all levels of
education (OECD, 2007b). Gruber and Wise (1999), OECD (2004), and Duval (2004) show
that the implicit tax on retirement amounts to around 30% for an older worker aged between
55–65, although there are substantial cross-country diﬀerences.9 The remaining parameters
9Gruber and Wise (1999) report the so-called ‘tax force’ statistic, which corresponds to the sum of
10(A, γ, η) are calibrated such that the individual is enrolled in education until age 18, he
retires at age 60, and spends 87% of his time endowment supplying labor after graduation.
Tax revenues are absorbed by the government to ﬁnance spending on public goods and
are not rebated.10 In the base-line simulation, the share of non-education, non-pension
spending is 30% of the present value of life-time income. Note that not only standard
income and substitution eﬀects of tax, education and pension policies will matter in the
simulations. Indeed, the tax and subsidy instruments do also aﬀect the education decision,
which determines yearly labor earnings. Therefore, changes in the level of education also
cause income and wealth eﬀects through their impact on earnings, and thereby indirectly
inﬂuence labor supply and retirement. Similarly, changes in the retirement age aﬀect life-time
wealth, which causes wealth eﬀects on labor supply as well.
Figure 3 plots the simulated life-cycle labor supply patterns for changes in the labor
tax rate, education subsidy, and the implicit tax on retirement. Each panel shows that
individuals are enrolled in initial education for the ﬁrst years of their lives, then labor is
supplied during working life, and the ﬁnal years of life are spent in retirement. The time
path of labor supply during working lives is downward sloping over the life cycle as leisure
rises over time, see the Euler equation for leisure (9).11 In the baseline simulation, labor
supply at the end of the life cycle is around 60%. If labor supply is interpreted as the
employment rate, the downward sloping path matches falling labor force participation rates
over the life cycle quite well (OECD, 2006).
The simulations show that the policy environment is crucial to understand choices made
over the life cycle. However, from these graphs alone we cannot infer to what extent these
eﬀects are driven by the direct impact of taxes on labor, education and retirement or by their
interactions. To disentangle the direct and interaction eﬀects we computed all (uncompen-
sated and compensated) elasticities of labor supply, education and retirement with respect to
all the policy variables. The uncompensated elasticities are calculated by changing a policy
variable and changing non-education and non-pension spending to keep the public budget
balanced. The compensated elasticities are computed by keeping life-time utility ﬁxed at
the baseline utility level with lump-sum transfers/taxes, which are ﬁnanced by adjustments
in non-education and non-pension spending.
We calculated the elasticities that allow for the full eﬀect of interactions between la-
bor, education, and retirement, and the same elasticities where the interactions have been
switched oﬀ. The latter is achieved by treating only one of the variables as endogenous, and
by ﬁxing the other two variables at the levels of the baseline simulation. Furthermore, we
computed the uncompensated and compensated elasticities of the total tax base TB for each
policy instrument in all these cases. As a measure for the tax base we take average yearly
marginal tax wedges on retirement while working during ages 55–69. Dividing the ‘tax force’ by 15 gives
a yearly average marginal tax wedge on retirement during working ages 55–69. OECD (2004) computes
marginal tax wedges on retirement which are around 20% (40%) on average for 55-59 (60-64) year old
workers. Duval (2004, p.33) calculates that average implicit tax rates in OECD countries are equal to 30%.
10Implicitly, we assume public goods enter in a completely separable fashion in the utility function.
11There are small kinks in the labor supply paths, because the model is discrete, but the education and
retirement choices are treated as continuous variables in the simulations. Therefore, the available time-
endowment in a given year is adjusted so as to capture the non-discreteness in education or retirement. For
example, if an individual is enrolled for 12.2 years in education, the available time endowment in the 13th

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12Table 2: Uncompensated and compensated elasticities of labor supply, education, retirement
and the tax base with respect to all policy variables
τa σb %c
Uncomp. Comp. Uncomp. Comp. Uncomp. Comp.
All endogenous
Ld -0.26 -0.49 0.06 0.15 -0.03 -0.01
S -0.30 -0.39 0.54 0.57 -0.06 -0.05
R -0.15 -0.28 0.03 0.08 -0.18 -0.16
TBe -0.46 -0.85 0.20 0.34 -0.22 -0.19
Only L endogenous
Ld -0.18 -0.40 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.00
TBe -0.18 -0.40 -0.08 0.00 -0.01 0.00
Only S endogenous
S -0.16 -0.16 0.48 0.48 0.00 0.00
TBe -0.03 -0.03 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00
Only R endogenous
R -0.10 -0.21 -0.04 0.00 -0.18 -0.17
TBe -0.10 -0.22 -0.04 0.00 -0.19 -0.18
Notes:
aThe tax elasticities are computed as the average of two elasticities, which are obtained from
a simulated 10%-point increase and a 10%-point decrease around the tax rate of the baseline
simulation (τ = 50%).
bThe subsidy elasticities are the average of the elasticities obtained from a 25%-point increase and
a 25%-point decrease around the subsidy rate of the baseline simulation (σ = 75%).
cThe retirement elasticities are the averages of a 10%-point increase and a 10%-point decrease
around the implicit tax rate of the baseline simulation (% = 30%).
dThe labor supply elasticity is computed for labor supply changes of a 40 year old individual.
eThe elasticity of the tax base is computed for average yearly income over the life-cycle.
labor earnings over the entire life cycle. Hence, this measure for the tax base is sensitive to
changes in labor force entry and exit. Table 2 shows the elasticities and reveals a number of
important insights.
• Realistic elasticities – The ﬁrst thing to note is that the calibration produces realistic
values for the (un)compensated elasticities of education, labor, and retirement in the
absence of interactions. With exogenous education and retirement, the uncompensated
tax elasticity of labor supply is equal to 0.18 (in absolute value). Thus, our approxi-
mation to ﬁx the wage elasticity at 0.2 has been reasonably accurate. Moreover, the
approximation for the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply of 0.40 is exact.
Furthermore, the uncompensated (compensated) retirement elasticity – at exogenous
education and labor supply – with respect to the retirement wedge is 0.18 (0.17) in
absolute value, which is in the ballpark of empirical ﬁndings, albeit a bit on the low
side. Not surprisingly, the uncompensated (compensated) education elasticity with
respect to the subsidy is 0.48 (0.48) – at exogenous labor and retirement – matches
13the elasticity of the earnings function (0.55) quite closely.
• Interactions important for tax elasticities – Panel A conﬁrms that higher labor taxes
result in rather large reductions in education, labor supply, and retirement ages. When,
besides labor supply, education and retirement are also endogenous, we see that the un-
compensated labor supply elasticity with respect to the tax increases from 0.18 to 0.26
in absolute value. Consequently, interaction eﬀects between labor supply, education
and retirement are important and drive up the tax elasticity of labor by almost 50%.
See also Jacobs (2005) and Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005). The education and retire-
ment elasticities with respect to taxation are also substantially aﬀected by interaction
eﬀects. The uncompensated education elasticity with respect to the tax rate almost
doubles from 0.16 to 0.30, whereas the retirement elasticity changes by 50% from 0.10
to 0.15. All elasticities are taken in absolute values. Substitution eﬀects dominate
income eﬀects in labor supply and retirement, since we ﬁnd negative uncompensated
elasticities.
• Interactions not important for subsidy and implicit retirement tax elasticities – The
subsidy on education only directly inﬂuences education choices. Similarly, the implicit
tax on retirement only directly inﬂuences retirement. The cross-elasticities of education
subsidies and retirement taxes are only driven by income eﬀects, since the compensated
cross-elasticities are zero. These ﬁndings illustrate that interaction eﬀects are only
important when one policy instrument aﬀects multiple choice margins, as taxes do,
but not when the policy instrument only aﬀects one margin, such as subsidies and
retirement beneﬁts. This holds true for both uncompensated and compensated changes.
• Elasticity of the tax base corresponds directly with elasticities of education or retirement
when the other margins are ﬁxed. This is not true for education – If education and
retirement are ﬁxed, the elasticity of the total tax base (with respect to any policy
variable) is, not surprisingly, equal to the labor supply elasticity for both compensated
and uncompensated changes. The same holds true for retirement, as long as education
and labor are ﬁxed. For education this is diﬀerent because it is an investment. A
higher level of education partially erodes the tax base, since individuals reduce the
length of their working career. Hence, the elasticities of the tax base are lower than
that of education when labor supply and retirement are exogenous.
• Elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate increases substantially due to
interactions – The tax base is far more elastic when, besides labor supply, education and
retirement are also endogenous. In particular, the absolute value of the uncompensated
tax elasticity of the tax base rises from 0.18 – with only endogenous labor supply –
to 0.46 – with endogenous learning and retirement as well. This is a 150% increase.
Therefore, the direct impact of taxes on education and retirement are also important, as
can be witnessed from their uncompensated elasticities. This ﬁnding is the application
of the Le Chˆ atelier Principle (Diamond and Mirrlees, 2002) because the elasticity of
the tax base increases substantially when more than one decision margin is aﬀected
by income taxation. Moreover, all decisions mutually reinforce each other. Quite
14surprisingly, our ﬁndings of the uncompensated tax base elasticity are completely in
line with the empirical estimate of 0.4 for the US by Saez and Gruber (2003).
• Elasticity of the tax base with respect to the subsidy rate increases substantially due to
impacts on labor and retirement – The uncompensated subsidy elasticity of the tax base
– including the interactions between labor, education, and retirement – is 0.20. This is
more than twice as high as the tax base elasticity without the impact of education on
labor and retirement (0.09). This is illustrated in Panel B. The subsidy only directly
increases human capital investments, but does not directly aﬀect labor supply and
retirement. However, higher education subsidies indirectly boost labor supply and
the retirement age as individuals become better educated. The costs of leisure and
retirement increase with the level of human capital. Consequently, relatively strong
eﬀects on labor supply and retirement ages are found. Higher levels of education
also result in higher incomes and larger life-time wealth, which raises the demand for
leisure and stimulates earlier retirement. However, these income eﬀects are outstripped
by dominant substitution eﬀects. Human capital policy can therefore be eﬀective
in oﬀsetting the disincentives on skill formation created by taxation and actuarially
unfair retirement schemes. Education subsidies help to contain the eﬃciency costs
of redistribution by exempting skill formation from explicit and implicit taxes (cf.
Bovenberg and Jacobs, 2005).
• Elasticity of the tax base with respect to the implicit tax on retirement increases little
due to impacts on education and retirement – The uncompensated elasticity of the tax
base with respect to the implicit tax on retirement – including the interactions between
labor, education, and retirement – is 0.22. This is only slightly larger than the tax
base elasticity without interactions with labor and retirement (0.19). See also panel C.
This ﬁgure shows that human capital investments and retirement decisions interact only
slightly, because returns to education at the end of the life cycle are heavily discounted.
Therefore, the feedback mechanism between education and retirement is asymmetric;
more education boosts retirement more than later retirement boosts education. Labor
supply responds marginally to a lower retirement wedge. Substitution eﬀects in wages
due to a higher education level are relatively small, and income and wealth eﬀects –
due to a longer working life – are relatively large. Both eﬀects roughly cancel out as
indicated by a near-zero uncompensated elasticity of labor.
• Taxation much more distortionary than commonly understood – The compensated elas-
ticities, which measure the eﬃciency losses of taxation are shown in the table as well.
Again we conﬁrm that the compensated elasticities of labor, education and retirement
(with respect to any policy instrument) substantially rise due to the interaction ef-
fects. The impact is, however, more modest in comparison with the uncompensated
elasticities. The reason is that the feedbacks between learning, working and retirement
are only driven by the uncompensated eﬀects of taxes. Indeed, if the uncompensated
labor supply elasticity were zero, labor supply would not change in response to a tax
change, and there would be no interaction eﬀects with learning and retirement. The
same is true for retirement, but not for education; the reason being that compensated
15Table 3: Policy packages for Continental-European, Nordic, Mediterranean, and Anglo-
Saxon countries
τ % σ
Continental Europe: Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany 0.60 0.40 0.83
Mediterranean countries: Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece 0.50 0.44 0.84
Nordic countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland 0.55 0.38 0.95
Anglo-Saxon countries: UK, Canada, Australia, US 0.41 0.14 0.54
Sources: Total marginal taxes on personal income, single worker without children earning 100%
average production wage in 2006 (OECD, 2007a). Education subsidies are computed as the pro-
portion of public expenditure on educational institutions for tertiary education in 2004 (OECD,
2007b). Implicit tax rates on retirement are the averages of for a 60-year old and 65-year old single
worker with average earnings in 1999.
and uncompensated elasticities for education are always equal, since there are no in-
come eﬀects in education choices. Once education and retirement are allowed to be
endogenous, we ﬁnd a very high compensated elasticity of the tax base. In particular,
the compensated elasticity of the tax base increases to 0.85 (an increase of more than
110%) once education and retirement are allowed to be endogenous. The endogeneity
of labor supply, education, and retirement can therefore be an alternative to the ‘social
multiplier’, which has been put forward by Alesina et al. (2005), to explain European
labor market performance.
As a ﬁnal exercise we have simulated the model with a set of policy parameters that
correspond with the policies of ‘Anglo-Saxon’, ‘Continental European’, Mediterranean’ and
‘Nordic’ countries. Table 3 lists the policy packages for each block of countries, which are
based on the (unweighed) averages of each group (see appendix for the underlying data).12
Panel D plots the simulated packages. These admittedly crude simulations show that
only a few policy parameters are able to mimic observed life-cycle labor market behavior
quite well. Table 4 confronts the simulated outcomes with the data. A caveat is in order
here because the cross-sectional averages are not directly comparable to outcomes from our
life-cycle model. The simulated results for education and retirement are not precise estimates
for cross-sectional averages if these variables have not reached their steady state values in the
data. Certainly, this is the case for education and retirement. In most advanced countries
education levels have dramatically increased and retirement ages have fallen severely during
the postwar period. The cross-sectional data represents averages over many generations,
each generation having had diﬀerent levels of education and retirement ages.
Bearing in mind the caveat, it is striking to ﬁnd a very close correspondence between
actual hours worked and simulated hours worked. Prescott’s (2004) claim that Europeans
work much less than Americans due to diﬀerences in tax levels can be fully explained by
taxation alone. Neither education subsidies nor implicit taxes on retirement can explain
this ﬁnding. Diﬀerences in the level of education subsidies would boost labor supply in
Continental Europe compared to Anglo-Saxon countries. Hence, this explanation goes astray.
12Many countries have recently introduced reforms so as to make their pension systems actuarially fairer.
The data on the implicit tax on retirement apply to 1999, and may therefore be slightly outdated.
16Furthermore, implicit taxes on retirement retirement hardly aﬀect labor supply, as we have
demonstrated earlier, see also table 2. In contrast to Prescott (2004), our simulations are
based on standard values for the labor supply elasticity, see also the discussion in Alesina et
al. (2005).
Average educational attainment is highest in Nordic countries due to high education
subsidies, and the simulated ﬁgure corresponds well with observed average years of education.
Also educational outcomes in Continental Europe match observed averages closely. The
model does not predict average years of education in the US and Mediterranean countries
well. Apart from cohort eﬀects, this may be caused as well by substantial heterogeneity in
education systems; we assume that education systems are identical across countries.
The simulations also substantially underestimate actual retirement ages in European
countries, but is very accurate for the Anglo-Saxon countries. We do not think that the
retirement elasticity is the culprit as it has been set at a relatively conservative value. The
more probable explanation is the presence of cohort eﬀects in the retirement data. Older
cohorts had much less generous (early) retirement schemes than younger ones. Consequently,
cross-sectional retirement data do not yet fully reﬂect the adverse incentive eﬀects of (early)
retirement schemes. Note that the total (implicit and explicit) tax wedges on retirement
are 76%, 72%, and 79% for Continental European, Mediterranean, and Nordic countries,
respectively. Anglo-Saxon countries only have a total tax wedge on retirement of 55%.
Consequently, retirement decisions in Europe are extremely distorted, and small changes
in taxes or retirement schemes result in substantial impact on the retirement age in our
simulations. These model simulations vindicate the concerns of many policy makers who are
reforming (early) retirement schemes. Moreover, it demonstrates the potential importance
of the explicit tax on retirement choices.
A ﬁnal remark is in order here. The simulated outcomes are as good as the model that
produces them. The assumption of perfect clearing of the labor market can be criticized
for being less relevant to the Continental-European context. Marginal tax rates typically
reduce distortions in non-competitive labor markets by punishing wage demands of unions,
by lowering the power of eﬃciency-wages, or by reducing the bargaining power of workers in
search models, see for example Layard et al. (1991), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994),
Pissarides (1998), Sørensen (1999), Bovenberg (2006), and Van der Ploeg (2006). However,
most of these papers only analyze the extensive margin of labor supply, not the intensive
margin. Thus, for those who are indeed in the labor market, the neoclassical labor supply
model might still be the relevant one to describe labor supply behavior – even in Continental-
European countries.
4 Conclusions
This paper developed and simulated a life-cycle model with endogenous skill formation,
endogenous labor supply and endogenous retirement. We show that there are important
feedbacks between education, labor supply, and retirement. Working more hours increases
the utilization rate of acquired human capital. Later retirement implies that human capital
depreciates less quickly. Moreover, skilled workers face weaker incentives to work less or re-
tire early. Labor taxation not only distorts labor supply, but also education and retirement
17Table 4: Observed data and simulated outcomes
Obs. L40 Sim. L40 Obs. S Sim. S Obs. R Sim. R
Continental Europe 0.60 0.67 12.3 12.0 59.4 54.6
Mediterranean countries 0.72 0.70 9.8 12.5 62.2 55.0
Nordic countries 0.64 0.65 13.0 13.2 62.4 54.7
Anglo-Saxon 0.73 0.73 13.1 11.4 62.6 62.5
Sources: Hours worked are yearly average hours worked from OECD (2006). We have converted
observed annual hours work in fractions of a total time endowment of 2416 hours per year. This
endowment is calculated by taking the Anglo-Saxon countries as the reference point and assuming
that the simulated labor supply of a 40-year old worker equals the observed number of hours worked
in the US. Data on average years of education in the population are taken from De la Fuente and
Domenech (2006). Retirement ages are taken from OECD (2005b) and apply to males only.
decisions. Actuarially unfair pensions exacerbate existing labor tax distortions on retire-
ment. Education subsidies cushion the adverse impacts of taxation on learning, working,
and retirement.
We simulated the life-cycle model with a realistic set of behavioral elasticities. Our sim-
ulations are able to mimic observed patterns of education, labor supply and retirement quite
well. In fact, our simulations bolster Prescott’s (2004) claim that high taxes are respon-
sible for lackluster labor market performance in Europe while not relying on implausibly
high labor supply elasticities. We demonstrate that both compensated and uncompensated
elasticities of the tax base are more than twice as high as standard labor supply elasticities.
In particular, the uncompensated (compensated) elasticities of the aggregate tax base are
as large as 0.46 (0.85). Furthermore, life-cycle interactions between learning, working and
retirement are quantitatively important and they raise all elasticities substantially. Welfare
state policies therefore involve much larger distortions than is commonly perceived.
Reforms in labor markets, pension systems and tax-beneﬁt systems can thus have very
substantial welfare gains. Indeed, if eligibility for various types of beneﬁts and early-
retirement schemes becomes more restricted, pension plans are made actuarially fairer, and
distorting taxes are lowered, labor market performance improves directly. However, these
policies also result in non-trivial eﬃciency gains because implicit tax wedges on skill forma-
tion are lowered, as the incentives improve to learn, to work, and to retire later. Moreover,
higher investment in human capital boosts labor market performance, since better-skilled
workers participate more and retire later. Human capital subsidies are consequently a vi-
tal part of modern welfare state policies to counter large direct and implicit taxes on skill
formation arising from labor market distortions and actuarially unfair pension schemes.
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Numerical solution
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This model can be reduced into a system of three non-linear equations – the ﬁrst-order
condition for retirement, the ﬁrst-order condition for education, and the household budget
22constraint – in three unknowns C0, S, and R. For given C0, the Euler equation for con-
sumption fully speciﬁes the time-path of consumption. For education level S and initial
consumption C0 (and therefore Ct) we can derive the full time-path of labor supply. The
education decision is a function of the retirement decision R only. The retirement decision
fully determined by education S and initial consumption C0. Hence, for a given level of ini-
tial consumption C0 the ﬁrst-order conditions for education and retirement jointly determine
optimal years of education and the retirement age. The level of consumption then follows
from the household budget constraint. We numerically solve this set of equations subject to
the Euler equations for consumption and labor supply.
Notice that we have treated the education and retirement decisions as continuous vari-
ables in these ﬁrst-order conditions. The reason is that avoiding integer constraints simpliﬁes
the computations considerably. Therefore, we must adjust the available time endowment in
a given year to correct for the non-discreteness in education or retirement. For example, if
an individual is enrolled for 12.2 years in education, the time endowment available for leisure
or working in the 13th year is reduced to 1−0.2 = 0.8. Similarly, when an individual retires
at 50.6 years, we adjusted the available time endowment in the 51st year to 1 − 0.6 = 0.4.
This adjustment in time endowments explains the small kinks in the labor supply paths.
Elasticities
Standard labor supply models are often cast in static frameworks, where non-labor incomes
do not change over time. This is not the case in a life-cycle setting, and this generally
aﬀects the expressions for labor supply elasticities. Only when non-labor incomes are zero
(e.g. due to a liquidity constraint), one can associate empirically measured static elasticities
with the (un)compensated labor supply elasticities derived in a dynamic framework. We
proceed by assuming ﬁrst that non-labor income is zero (i.e., no savings or debt and no
lump-sum transfers) and then show how the presence of non-labor incomes aﬀect the sizes
of the elasticities in our simulation settings. See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a more
elaborate discussion on these matters.
When non-labor income is zero, the household decides how much to work during each
period. The corresponding static labor supply problem in each period is given by
max
Ct,Lt










, s.t. Ct = wLt, (27)
where w ≡ (1 − τ)W(S). The ﬁrst-order condition for labor supply is as before (omitting
time sub-scripts)




C−1/θ = w. (28)






















23These expressions can be solved to ﬁnd the relative change in labor in terms of the relative










The compensated elasticity is derived as follows. First, we totally diﬀerentiate the utility






C−1/θ = w. (32)










Substitution of the latter result in the linearized ﬁrst-order condition and solving for the










This appendix simulates the baseline model for a wide array of behavioral elasticities. Figure
4 gives the outcomes. Panel A gives the outcomes when elasticity of the human capital
production function is varied between α = 0.2 and α = 0.7. A higher human capital elasticity
increases the returns to education and entry in the labor market is delayed because more
years are invested in initial education. As the wage rate during the working career increases,
labor supply increases due to a dominant substitution eﬀect which can be seen from the
upward shift of the labor supply schedule. Also, retirement is substantially delayed when
skill levels increase, as higher forgone labor earnings render earlier retirement less attractive.
Clearly, skill formation is both complementary to skill utilization (labor supply) and slower
skill depreciation (later retirement).
Panel B shows the simulation results in which the inter-temporal elasticity of labor supply
is varied from ε = 0.1 to ε = 1.25. A higher elasticity has a number of eﬀects. First, the
labor supply schedule rotates clockwise as individuals are more willing to substitute leisure
intertemporally. Second, as the labor supply schedule rotates, average skill utilization falls,
because less labor is supplied during working life. Skill depreciation also increases as a
higher ε results in earlier retirement, because forgone wages during retirement decrease
when substantially less labor is supplied at the end of the working career. As skill utilization
falls, and skill depreciation increases, initial investment in human capital is reduced. Third,
a larger ε increases the wage elasticity of labor supply, and this gives stronger incentives to
invest in initial education. Apparently, this eﬀect is weaker than the negative impacts of a
shorter working career and lower average labor supply.
Panel C gives simulations in which the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in con-





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































25market outcomes. Indeed, compensated labor supply and retirement elasticities substantially
increase as θ rises (see appendix). This results in higher labor supply and later retirement.
Hence, the incentives for investment in human capital increase on both accounts. Second,
income and wealth eﬀects diminish when θ increases. This implies that uncompensated elas-
ticities also increase (see appendix). Consequently, labor supply is boosted and retirement
delayed, which results in more initial education.
Panel D shows how the outcomes are aﬀected when the retirement elasticity is varied
between β = 0.25 and β = 1.75. Clearly, a substantial impact of the retirement elasticity on
the retirement age are found. This is the consequence of the high total (explicit and implicit)
marginal tax wedge on retirement of 1−(1−τ)(1−%) = 65% in the baseline scenario. Small
changes in the retirement elasticity then causes large behavioral changes. As retirement
ages are lower, returns to education decrease, and investments in human capital diminish.
The impact is moderate mainly due to heavily discounting of more distant income streams.
The impact on labor supply is very small. Earlier retirement causes a wealth eﬀect, which




Netherlands 0.51 - 0.79
Belgium 0.66 0.51 0.87
France 0.56 0.61 0.81
Germany 0.66 0.09 0.87
Portugal 0.47 0.14 0.92
Spain 0.46 0.63 0.77
Italy 0.52 0.54 0.72
Greece 0.54 - 0.97
Denmark 0.49 - 0.97
Norway 0.51 0.31 0.97
Sweden 0.63 0.40 0.89
Finland 0.55 0.43 0.96
Australia 0.35 0.21 0.48
Canada 0.41 0.11 0.56
United Kingdom 0.41 0.18 0.70
United States 0.34 0.13 0.43
Sources: Marginal total tax wedge on personal income for a single worker without children earning
100% average production wage in 2006, (OECD, 2007a). Education subsidies are computed as the
proportions of public expenditure on educational institutions for tertiary education in 2004 (OECD,
2007b). Implicit tax rates on retirement are the averages of for a 60-year old and 65-year old single
worker with average earnings in 1999 (Duval, 2004, p.23).
27CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2213 Jun-ichi Itaya and Heinrich W. Ursprung, Price and Death, February 2008 
 
2214 Valentina Bosetti, Carlo Carraro and Emanuele Massetti, Banking Permits: Economic 
Efficiency and Distributional Effects, February 2008 
 
2215 Assar Lindbeck, Mårten Palme and Mats Persson, Social Interaction and Sickness 
Absence, February 2008 
 
2216 Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels, The Limits of Trust in Economic Transactions - 
Investigations of Perfect Reputation Systems, February 2008 
 
2217 Hartmut Egger and Peter Egger, The Trade and Welfare Effects of Mergers in Space, 
February 2008 
 
2218 Dorothee Crayen and Joerg Baten, Global Trends in Numeracy 1820-1949 and its 
Implications for Long-Run Growth, February 2008 
 
2219 Stephane Dees, M. Hashem Pesaran, L. Vanessa Smith and Ron P. Smith, Identification 
of New Keynesian Phillips Curves from a Global Perspective, February 2008 
 
2220 Jerome L. Stein, A Tale of Two Debt Crises: A Stochastic Optimal Control Analysis, 
February 2008 
 
2221 Michael Melvin, Lukas Menkhoff and Maik Schmeling, Automating Exchange Rate 
Target Zones: Intervention via an Electronic Limit Order Book, February 2008 
 
2222 Raymond Riezman and Ping Wang, Preference Bias and Outsourcing to Market: A 
Steady-State Analysis, February 2008 
 
2223 Lars-Erik Borge and Jørn Rattsø, Young and Old Competing for Public Welfare 
Services, February 2008 
 
2224 Jose Apesteguia, Steffen Huck, Jörg Oechssler and Simon Weidenholzer, Imitation and 
the Evolution of Walrasian Behavior: Theoretically Fragile but Behaviorally Robust, 
February 2008 
 
2225 Walter Krämer, Long Memory with Markov-Switching GARCH, February 2008 
 
2226 António Afonso and Christophe Rault, What do we really Know about Fiscal 
Sustainability in the EU? A Panel Data Diagnostic, February 2008 
 
2227 Sergey M. Kadochnikov and Igor M. Drapkin, Market Structure, Technological Gap 
and Vertical Linkage Effects from Foreign Direct Investment, February 2008 
 
  
2228 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Davide Ciferri and Alessandro Girardi, Fiscal Shocks and 
Real Exchange Rate Dynamics: Some Evidence for Latin America, February 2008 
 
2229 Scott Alan Carson, Geography and Insolation in 19
th Century US African-American and 
White Statures, February 2008 
 
2230 Wolfgang Buchholz and Jan Schumacher, Discounting and Welfare Analysis Over 
Time: Choosing the η, February 2008 
 
2231 M. Hashem Pesaran, Christoph Schleicher and Paolo Zaffaroni, Model Averaging in 
Risk Management with an Application to Futures Markets, February 2008 
 
2232 Wilhelm Kohler, Offshoring: Why Do Stories Differ?, February 2008 
 
2233 Stefan Bach, Giacomo Corneo and Viktor Steiner, Effective Taxation of Top Incomes in 
Germany, 1992-2002, February 2008 
 
2234 Robert S. Chirinko, σ: The Long And Short Of It, February 2008 
 
2235 Volker Grossmann and Holger Strulik, Should Continued Family Firms Face Lower 
Taxes than other Estates?, February 2008 
 
2236 Guido Tabellini, The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives, February 2008 
 
2237 Heinrich W. Ursprung and Christian Wiermann, Reputation, Price, and Death: An 
Empirical Analysis of Art Price Formation, March 2008 
 
2238 Hans Fehr and Christian Habermann, Private Retirement Savings in Germany: The 
Structure of Tax Incentives and Annuitization, March 2008 
 
2239 Joseph Francois and Ian Wooton, Market Structure and Market Access, March 2008 
 
2240 Hiroyuki Kasahara and Beverly Lapham, Productivity and the Decision to Import and 
Export: Theory and Evidence, March 2008 
 
2241 Gary E. Bolton and Axel Ockenfels, Does Laboratory Trading Mirror Behavior in Real 
World Markets? Fair Bargaining and Competitive Bidding on EBay, March 2008 
 
2242 Atsushi Oshima, B. Ravikumar and Raymond Riezman, Entrepreneurship, Organization 
Capital and the Evolution of the Firm, March 2008 
 
2243 Walter Krämer and Sebastian Schich, Large-Scale Disasters and the Insurance Industry, 
March 2008 
 
2244 Leif Danziger, Adjustment Costs, Inventories and Output, March 2008 
 
2245 Anne van Aaken, Lars P. Feld and Stefan Voigt, Power over Prosecutors Corrupts 
Politicians: Cross Country Evidence Using a New Indicator, March 2008 
 
  
2246 Hans-Christian Heinemeyer, Max-Stephan Schulze and Nikolaus Wolf, Endogenous 
Borders? The Effects of New Borders on Trade in Central Europe 1885-1933, March 
2008 
 
2247 Johannes Becker and Clemens Fuest, Tax Competition – Greenfield Investment versus 
Mergers and Acquisitions, March 2008 
 
2248 Giorgio Bellettini and Hubert Kempf, Why not in your Backyard? On the Location and 
Size of a Public Facility, March 2008 
 
2249 Jose Luis Evia, Roberto Laserna and Stergios Skaperdas, Socio-Political Conflict and 
Economic Performance in Bolivia, March 2008 
 
2250 Bas Jacobs and A. Lans Bovenberg, Optimal Taxation of Human Capital and the 
Earnings Function, March 2008 
 
2251 Jan-Egbert Sturm and Timo Wollmershäuser, The Stress of Having a Single Monetary 
Policy in Europe, March 2008 
 
2252 Guido Schwerdt, Labor Turnover before Plant Closure: ‘Leaving the Sinking Ship’ vs. 
‘Captain Throwing Ballast Overboard’, March 2008 
 
2253 Keith E. Maskus and Shuichiro Nishioka, Development-Related Biases in Factor 
Productivities and the HOV Model of Trade, March 2008 
 
2254 Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvie, Contract Enforcement, Institutions and Social 
Capital: the Maghribi Traders Reappraised, March 2008 
 
2255 Imed Drine and Christophe Rault, Purchasing Power Parity for Developing and 
Developed Countries. What can we Learn from Non-Stationary Panel Data Models?, 
March 2008 
 
2256 Scott Alan Carson, Health, Wealth and Inequality: a Contribution to the Debate about 
the Relationship between Inequality and Health, March 2008 
 
2257 C.A.E. Goodhart, The Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, March 2008 
 
2258 Stefan Bauernschuster, Oliver Falck and Stephan Heblich, The Impact of Continuous 
Training on a Firm’s Innovations, March 2008 
 
2259 Michael Grimm and Stephan Klasen, Geography vs. Institutions at the Village Level, 
March 2008 
 
2260 Fwu-Ranq Chang, Property Insurance, Portfolio Selection and their Interdependence, 
March 2008 
 




2262 Hans Jarle Kind, Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup, Efficiency 
Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets, March 2008 
 
2263 M. Hashem Pesaran, Til Schuermann and L. Vanessa Smith, Forecasting Economic and 
Financial Variables with Global VARs, March 2008 
 
2264 Volker Grossmann, Entrepreneurial Innovation and Sustained Long-run Growth without 
Weak or Strong Scale Effects, March 2008 
 
2265 Robert S. Chirinko and Huntley Schaller, The Irreversibility Premium, March 2008 
 
2266 Andrea Galeotti and José Luis Moraga-González, Platform Intermediation in a Market 
for Differentiated Products, April 2008 
 
2267 Torben M. Andersen and Michael Svarer, The Role of Workfare in Striking a Balance 
between Incentives and Insurance in the Labour Market, April 2008 
 
2268 Harald Badinger, Cyclical Fiscal Policy, Output Volatility, and Economic Growth, April 
2008 
 
2269 Thomas Aronsson and Erkki Koskela, Outsourcing and Optimal Nonlinear Taxation: A 
Note, April 2008 
 
2270 Gary E. Bolton, Claudia Loebbecke and Axel Ockenfels, How Social Reputation 
Networks Interact with Competition in Anonymous Online Trading: An Experimental 
Study, April 2008 
 
2271 Nikolaus Wolf, Scylla and Charybdis. Explaining Europe’s Exit from Gold, January 
1928 – December 1936, April 2008 
 
2272 Michael Funke and Marc Gronwald, The Undisclosed Renminbi Basket: Are the 
Markets Telling us something about where the Renminbi – US Dollar Exchange Rate is 
Going?, April 2008 
 
2273 Thor Olav Thoresen and Annette Alstadsæter, Shifts in Organizational Form under a 
Dual Income Tax System, April 2008 
 
2274 Helge Berger and Volker Nitsch, Too many Cooks? Committees in Monetary Policy, 
April 2008 
 
2275 Yin-Wong Cheung and Eiji Fujii, Deviations from the Law of One Price in Japan, April 
2008 
 
2276 Michael S. Michael, Sajal Lahiri and Panos Hatzipanayotou, Integrated Reforms of 
Indirect Taxes in the Presence of Pollution, April 2008 
 
2277 Bas Jacobs, Is Prescott Right? Welfare State Policies and the Incentives to Work, Learn 
and Retire, April 2008 